In addition to core courses in policy implementation and research methods, MIP students will select two specializations from a set of functional themes, geographic areas, or both. A minimum of three classes is required to complete a theme/area. Courses fulfilling a specialization must be approved by the student’s advisory committee.

Prior to the completion of the degree program MIP students must demonstrate competency in a foreign language that is the equivalent to two years of study at the undergraduate level.

Functional themes: there are three main themes: political development, foreign policy, and globalization. Within themes, students can take classes focusing on issues such as: peace and security, post-industrial societies and the EU, political development, international policy making, environment and sustainable development, international law, foreign policy, WMD proliferation, arms control, intelligence.

Examples: students may select from a menu of classes in order to specialize in a theme. Examples of courses that can be used to fulfill a specialization include, but are not limited to the following:

Theme: Political Development
INTL 8325 Democracy, Democratization and Civil Society
INTL 8340 Developing Political Systems
INTL 8370 Public Opinion and Participation
INTL 8315 Politics of the Middle East

Theme: Foreign Policy
INTL 8250 American Foreign Policy
INTL 8260 Human Rights Policy
INTL 8280 Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict
INTL 8290 Strategic Intelligence

Theme: Globalization
INTL 8240 International Political Economy
INTL 8280 Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict
INTL 8325 Comparative Democracy, Democratization and Civil Society
INTL 8355 Labor, Class and Politics
INTL 8360 Government and Business
INTL 8385 Identity Politics


Geographic areas: There are three main geographic areas: Developed Societies, Developing Societies, and Communist/Post Communist Societies. Within these areas students may take classes focusing on particular regions such as: European politics, Asian politics, African politics, Latin American politics, Eastern Europe, and Middle Eastern politics.

Theme: Developed Societies
INTL 8310 Politics of Industrialized Democracies
INTL 8320 Politics of the European Union
INTL 8355 Labor, Class, and Politics
INTL 8360 Government and Business

Theme: Developing Societies
INTL 8315 Comparative Politics of the Middle East
INTL 8330 Politics of Post Communist Political Systems
INTL 8345 Comparative Politics of Sub-Saharan Africa
INTL 8340 Developing Political Systems
INTL 8380 Russian and East European Politics
INTL 8390 East Asian Political Systems


Graduation requirements:
MIP students are required to complete a Capstone Paper before graduation.  There are two formats for this requirement, depending upon the student’s experience and career objectives.

For students with experience in the field: Internship/Professional Paper.
To include an analysis of their responsibilities and duties, projects completed, and tasks performed; the relevance of their academic work to their experience and the relationship between the two; suggestions for improving the MIP program.

For students without such experience: Individual or Team Policy Analysis.
Students or student teams will complete a policy analysis project reflecting the core insights from the policy analysis class and subsequent coursework.

The Capstone Paper should be 15-20 pages in length, and must be completed by the midpoint of the final semester. A two-person faculty committee will evaluate each paper.  Each student or student team will sit for an oral exam of the Capstone Paper after it has been approved by their faculty committee.

Download MIP Timetable

The Capstone Paper should be 15-20 pages in length, and must be completed by the midpoint of the final semester. A two-person faculty committee will evaluate each paper. Each student or student team will sit for an oral exam of the Capstone Paper after it has been approved by their faculty committee.

Course Descriptions
(scheduling to be determined)

Domestic Structures and Regional Dynamics of Proliferation
This course begins with a clear and necessary conceptual distinction between vertical and horizontal proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and their delivery systems. It then focuses on two levels of explanations for why and how each type of proliferation happens. First, it examines the sub-state level to identify the usual domestic coalitions that support and maintain efforts by a state to acquire unconventional weapons capabilities. Second, it analyzes the factors that might push these coalitions to move up the proliferation ladder from initial “acquisition of capability” to “acquisition of useable devices and/or weapons”. The course will examine case of (1) countries that proliferated in the past and have since de-proliferated; (2) countries that continue to engage in vertical proliferation, and (3) countries that appear to support their vertical proliferation efforts by engaging in horizontal proliferation. This examination would also allow us to assess various explanations for why countries proliferate and/or why some decide to reverse course.

The second part of the course will look at the dyadic and triadic relationships in various parts of the globe that appear to fuel proliferation. We will examine three examples of proliferation—South Asia, the Middle East and North East Asia—where dyadic or triadic conflicts provide the rationale for proliferation. We will look at common characteristics of such conflicts that shape proliferation activities of the actors. We will also examine the unique characteristics of each region vis-à-vis apparent (current) and expected (future) modes of proliferation.

The last part of the course attempts to distill some recommendations on what extra-regional actors like the United States can do to retard if not stop proliferation. This will include an assessment of unilateral versus multilateral approaches to promote de-proliferation and non-proliferation in these regions and elsewhere.


Technology and Proliferation in International Security
Technology refers to the application of science, especially to industrial or commercial objectives. Proliferation means ‘to spread or grow at a rapid rate.’ In general, therefore, we expect that the international community would welcome and promote technology proliferation since it brings the fruits of science to mankind rapidly. This course, however, focuses on the dilemmas that arise when the technology in question is ‘dual-use’: it has both civil (industrial and commercial) as well as military (conventional and unconventional) applications. Proliferation, in such cases, becomes a negative development because it enables countries or sub-state actors to acquire destructive capabilities that can be used against their domestic and regional opponents, or at the very least, can be used to blackmail the international community into accepting their political or military agendas.

The course begins with an overview of the broad areas of technology and industries that are increasingly considered dual-use: nuclear, chemical, biological, civil space, and information—among others—and examines their non-obvious military applications. It then examine the various challenges faced by the international community in instituting measures to regulate the flow of such technologies—to ensure that countries, companies, and other civil society groups use them only for civilian purposes. First, we will examine the broad ‘definitional’ issues in deciding if a country or a group within it is engaged in “proliferation,” and the diplomatic challenges in generating a multilateral consensus on the decision to take preventive steps against such proliferation. Second, we will analyze the practical issues in controlling the spread of dual-use technologies, including such topics as: (1) the identification of tangible items/materials to be controlled, (2) assessing the probability that a seemingly legitimate/civil recipient might divert items to military end uses, and (3) developing tools to verify such non-diversion.

The course will conclude with a discussion on how technology-suppliers like the United States can promote international consensus on dual-use technology controls and if they can develop technologies/practices that can predict modes of proliferation by a particular country or group.


Dimensions of CBRN Security
This course is designed to familiarize students with the origins and risks posed by the criminal use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials and available tools to mitigate these risks. For the purpose of the course, CBRN security is defined as the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving CBRN materials or their associated facilities. By focusing on risk evaluation (risk = probability of success by adversary + consequence of success) the analysis can optimize the design of preventive and protective measures by selecting those commensurate with the level of risk acceptance. Commonly used methodologies of vulnerability assessment will provide additional practical tools of dealing with CBRN threats.

The course is designed to deal with three basic dimensions of CBRN security. First, it examines the legal and regulatory framework, especially UNSCR 1540 which is a major international instrument. Second, it analyzes relevant security technologies and procedures. And third, the course probes the dimensions of the human factor, because the flexibility and intelligence of people are critical elements in preventing criminal use of CBRN and managing unforeseen circumstances.


Global Nuclear Governance
Throughout the history of nuclear power generation, major accidents served as powerful wake-up calls for the world community to find appropriate fixes. A distinguishing feature of the Fukushima disaster is that it happened at the height of what is known as the “global nuclear renaissance”— in the age of advanced communications and social media, and in one of the most technologically advanced countries of the world. This course is designed to compare the lessons learned from nuclear disasters at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl to those which are being derived from Fukushima. It focuses largely on factors that are likely to push the international community toward rethinking the “rules of the game” by laying the groundwork for global nuclear governance.

There is no widely accepted definition of global nuclear governance. With its conceptualization still in the making, students will be able to have a hands-on experience in analyzing ongoing events, following trends and passing their own judgments. These unique “in-real-time” circumstances are likely to contribute to more creative thinking and theories application.
Even though global nuclear governance is still a loose construct about safety, security and proliferation risks as cross-cutting elements, it can eventually represent a complex web of legal instruments and arrangements; diverse stakeholders and organizations; national, regional and international programs; shared professional cultures and other components. The architecture of global nuclear governance will never be finite or complete because these building blocks are continuously being negotiated, experimented with and improved. Nevertheless, globalization of nuclear power infrastructure will make global governance a compelling necessity for the international community—as individual countries choose and implement their of nuclear power options.


Legal, Normative and Institutional Architecture of Nonproliferation
This course introduces the concept of nonproliferation—its origins, history, objectives, politics, and the main players. It also offers an outline and history of the international legal framework that undergirds nonproliferation (NPT, NWFZs, 1540, CWC, BWC, etc.), and presents an overview of the multitude of international nonproliferation institutions, their role in promoting, implementing and enforcing the nonproliferation agenda, as well as their achievements, challenges, and prospects for the future. The institutions presented will include, among others, the IAEA, OPCW, 1540 Committee, UNODA, UNICRI, and UNODC. The purpose of the course is to provide students with a comprehensive and critical understanding of the nonproliferation milieu, and to equip them with the necessary knowledge and tools to enable them to navigate this field in their future careers as policy professionals.


Arms Control and Disarmament
This course focuses on the history, successes, and failures of multilateral and bilateral efforts to controls levels of conventional and unconventional weapons, and to reduce their numbers. The course examines: (1) weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the means of their delivery in relevant geopolitical and geostrategic contexts, (2) past and current efforts to control and reduce the numbers of WMDs, focusing on the 20th and early 21st centuries (with the particular emphasis on the Cold War), (3) major treaties and agreements that constitute the current body of the international law on arms control and disarmament, (4) successes and challenges of the arms control and disarmament regime, and (5) the economics and politics of conventional arms trade, and the prospects of a meaningful Arms Control Treaty.


The Political Economy and Management of Strategic Trade
Strategic trade policy, the transfers of dual-use and defense items, is simultaneous critical to economic and security variables of statecraft. During the Cold War, the United States and its allies tightly controlled the trade of strategic items to the Communist Bloc. But that limited conception of export controls has expanded significantly with the globalization of technology and trade. In the current environment, efforts to manage strategic trade are closely intertwined with processes of economic development, conflict management, the arms trade, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on a global basis.

This course will examine the history of and current national, regional, and international strategic trade management policies. Moreover, we will focus in-depth on the political economy of strategic trade. Through a series of case studies, the course will review how technological change, global governance and contemporary models of sovereignty influence the tenor and practice of strategic trade management. This course provides both the theoretical backdrop as well as practical information to support students who may be interested in careers involved in global trade and nonproliferation.


Securitization and Proliferation: the Articulation [and Ownership] of Sovereign Risk
The Copenhagen School of international relations argues that “security” is a speech act with distinct consequences in the context over international politics. By talking about security an actor tries to move a topic away from politics and into an area of security concerns, thereby legitimating extraordinary means against the socially constructed threat. The process of securitization is inter-subjective meaning that it is neither a question of an objective threat or a subjective perception of a threat. Instead securitization of a subject depends on an audience accepting the securitization speech act.

In this course, the securitization construct will be applied to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, exploring the evolution of the international nonproliferation discourse. Drawing heavily on the Copenhagen School and Wendt’s social theory of international politics, we will examine the means by which risk and threat are conceptualized and articulated into policy at the national and international levels. Although the course delves into constructivist IR theory, it is ultimately linked to critical issues of public policy. The course provides a thorough overview and analysis of policy mechanisms as well as their applications in international politics.


Proliferation and Terror in the 21st Century
This course examines changes in our understanding of weapons proliferation and of nonproliferation regimes in the years following the end of the cold war. It then proceeds to an exploration of how nonproliferation and associated policies are changing as a response both to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and to the possibility that terrorists or “rogue states” might acquire and use nuclear or other “unconventional” weapons. As part of this process, the course necessarily engages in detailed examinations of two transnational phenomena, “proliferation” and “terrorism.” We will critically evaluate the U.S. response to terrorism from various perspectives such as effectiveness, military action, budgetary considerations, intelligence activities, civil liberties, foreign policy, public opinion, governmental reorganization, and its evolution. Finally, we will attempt to gage the recent effects of terrorism on the overall policy environment and on the character of liberal democracy itself.


Global Internal Security and Counterterrorism
This research seminar is structured to assess the dimensions and importance of terrorism as a present and future security issue. It examines the internal security instruments and counterterrorist methods that states and militaries have at their disposal. Terrorist organizations are dynamic and routinely adapt to counterterrorist efforts. For this reason, any program to combat terror, whether initiated by a single state or cooperatively among states, must be flexible and adaptive. The class will seek to understand how this terror-counter-terror dynamic plays out over time.

Of necessity, the course will examine the role of 9/11 in reshaping the dynamics of internal security and counterterrorism in the 21st century. Looking back over the past decade, what kinds of internal security infrastructure have been put in place in the United States and other democratic countries? Certainly there is some point where the nature of the modern liberal polity is altered by the application of economy-wide internal security measures. Are the European or Japanese constructions of terrorism and internal security, for example, similar to and/or compatible with those of the United States? What can we say about the internal security structures of more authoritarian states?

We will also need to address the question of the evolution and recent rapid advances in the technologies of surveillance, data storage, biometrics and control. It may be that we have reached a point in history where the technology is now available to usher in an era of “authoritarian” democracy, an internal security state-within-the-state that may not be compatible with the essential characteristics of the modern liberal states that mainly populate North America and Western Europe.

SPRING 2013 CAPSTONE PAPER TIMELINE